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THE POWER OF THE BODY: ANALYZING THE 





Under conditions of extreme social and political injustice—when human rights are most threatened—rational   
arguments rooted in the language of human rights are often unlikely to spur reform or to ensure government 
adherence to citizens’ rights.  When those entrusted with securing human dignity, rights, and freedoms fail to 
do so, and when other actors—such as human rights activists, international institutions, and social 
movements—fail to engage the levers of power to eliminate injustice, then oppressed and even quotidian actors 
may resort to non-traditional tactics of resistance.  One example of these radical modes is the use of the 
corporeal body as a means of protest.  The use of the human body to make political argument may catalyze 
legal, social, and cultural change where rational arguments fail.  This Article examines the power of the 
human body in spurring political and legal action.  It analyzes the 2010 self-immolation of Tarek 
Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia, which sparked an unprecedented wave of protests across Arab countries, 
leading to what came to be known as the “Arab Spring.”  It suggests that when human rights-based 
arguments are exhausted, space is created for alternative strategies of resistance.  Mobilized and deployed as 
tools of resistance, human bodies become the argument. 
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When life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge sovereignty, the power over life and 
death that the sovereign exercises becomes useless.  The absolute weapons against bodies 
are neutralized by the voluntary and absolute negation of the body. 
 
    –Hardt and Negri 
This Article examines the power of the human body in spurring political and legal action when the 
appeal to human rights reaches its limits.  This Article analyzes the 2010 self-immolation of Tarek 
Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia, which sparked an unprecedented wave of protests across Arab countries, 
leading to what came to be known as the “Arab Spring.”  In light of the limitations of—or, perhaps, the 
complete absence of—other strategies to effectively challenge injustice, this Article uses Bouazizi as a case 
study to explore why and how otherwise invisible and oppressed “bodies-in-pain” are able to mobilize social, 
political, and legal change.  This Article then proposes that prior to 2011, in contexts such as Tunisia, human 
rights–based legal norms had little persuasive or transformative power.  Instead, the deployment of the 
human body proved to be more effective in igniting socio-political change than rational arguments based in 
law.  Although Bouazizi’s act occurred outside of any organized social movement, it cannot be understood in 
isolation from the social context.  Bouazizi’s self-immolation constituted an act of defiance that succeeded in 
sparking social change because it amplified a pre-existing dynamic of broader social frustration and rendered 
it material, visible, and visceral.  What Bouazizi’s self-immolation makes clear is that the corporeal form, 
rather than law, can constitute an argument powerful enough to topple a tyrannical regime.1 
The first section of this Article focuses on the limits of rational human rights–based legal norms in 
combating injustice.  It argues that human rights law proves no match for certain conditions of 
authoritarianism.  Under such circumstances, the law is an ineffective tool to protect fundamental rights and 
can even become a means of licensing injustice.  
The second section analyzes the self-immolation of Tarek Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia, 
contending that when human rights–based arguments are exhausted, space is created for alternative forms of 
dissent.  Mobilized and deployed as a tool of resistance, the human body itself becomes the argument for 
overdue political change.  Much has been written about the use of self-immolation as a form of political 
protest; this section offers an original account of the political body as a body-in-pain, where the performance 
of pain becomes a catalyst of socio-political change. 
In the third section, this Article offers an understanding of the body when it is positioned as the 
argument.  The section explores the difficulty of communicating, expressing, and understanding pain.  
When pain cannot be denied or confined, the body expresses its own desperation and frustration, as well 
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as that of others who have been rendered speechless.  Through the powerful public spectacle of the body-in-
pain, the very act of self-immolation transforms an individual corporeal act into a mass movement. 
The final section explores how by returning to the law, the oppressed population challenges the 
impotence of rational argument, reshapes the geographies of marginalization, establishes a break with the 
past, and negotiates a new pact with the state.  Through an analysis of the preamble of the post-revolution 
Tunisian constitution, this Article illustrates how the body-in-pain under certain conditions of subjugation 
and disenfranchisement can successfully convert the perception of bodily self-destruction from an individual 
act of frustration and defiance to an act of mass mobilization that possesses socially transformative power.  
This Article suggests that in the case of Tunisia, the very body-in-pain that revealed the limits of rational 
rights-based arguments succeeded through a dialectical process in transforming the legal corpus. 
II. THE FUTILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW–BASED RATIONAL ARGUMENTS 
A. International Human Rights Law 
The principles of international human rights law emerged in the aftermath of World War II (WWII).  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) of 19482 affirmed the inherent rights enjoyed by all 
people:  
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.  Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, 
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.3  
By signing the UDHR, world leaders aimed to put an end to atrocities such as those committed in WWII.  
Along with the addition of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)4 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)5 in 1966, the International Bill 
of Human Rights6 detailed a conception of universal and inalienable human rights which have binding legal 
effects on all states.7  The covenants set forth the entitlement of all mankind to interdependent and indivisible 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. 8   Over the course of time, this consensus and 
commitment to universal rights—in the form of treaties, customary international law, general principles, 
regional agreements, declarations, and domestic law—has become the body of international human rights 
                                                
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
3 Id. at 2.  
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. (entered into 
force Jan. 3, 1976). 
6 The International Bill of Human Rights is composed of the UDHR 1948, the ICCPR 1966 and its two 
Optional Protocols, and the ICESCR 1966. See infra note 7.  
7  International Human Rights Law, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
8 G.A. Res. 421(V), subsec. (E), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (Dec. 4, 1950). 
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law.9  States have demonstrated their commitment to this body of law by ratifying international treaties, 
signaling their subscription and intent to adhere to this conception of international law and all it entails. 
In principle, by ratifying the International Bill of Human Rights, governments assume various 
obligations and duties.  They pledge to meet the minimum requirements of the universally agreed to human 
rights principles and to perform their obligations as part of their tacit social contract with their population to 
the best of their abilities.  State governments commit to proactively engage in or refrain from specific acts, 
with the ultimate goal of promoting, fulfilling, and protecting universally recognized human rights.10  Through 
ratifications, governments pledge to adopt the necessary measures, including implementing legislation, to 
ensure that their treaty obligations are met.  They are entrusted with ensuring the compatibility of their 
domestic laws and policies with the international treaties, aimed at protecting and advancing the status of 
human rights in their countries.11  In addition to lawmaking, governments are supposed to take certain 
measures and deploy mechanisms to cement their obligations, preserve order, and enhance societal cohesion.  
States have the duty to put in place all measures to exercise their powers “of conferring a name on [their] 
people and a meaning on their social action.”12 
Human rights defenders and those entrusted with promoting the language of rights systematically 
refer to these internationally recognized human rights standards as part of the world’s basic customs.13  They 
generally use human rights-based law arguments as universally recognized tools to uphold fundamental rights 
and values, to foster human well-being and dignity, and to  address the consequences of government violence 
and abuses of power.  Accordingly, they perceive human rights discourse as an effective, universal, and 
rational form of argument.14 
B. Instrumental Value Of International Treaties 
At present, all UN member states have ratified at least one of the nine core international human 
rights treaties, with eighty percent having ratified four or more instruments.15  While this number provides a 
clear indication of widespread formal state support for international human rights law, the question remains 
as to whether states’ ratification of international treaties contributes to the effective realization of human 
rights.  
Profoundly repressive regimes ratify international treaties and officially express their rhetorical 
commitment to internationally recognized laws and norms protecting human rights. 16   But an official 
endorsement of human rights norms does not guarantee state compliance with their international 
obligations.17  State practices clearly indicate that ratification and public endorsement of human rights norms 
                                                
9  The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12  CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 48 (2010). 
13 Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 400, 405 (1984). 
14 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (3d ed. 
2002). 
15 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 9. 
16 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law To 
Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 408 (2007). 
17 Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 590 
(2007). 
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by political leaders are no guarantee that these norms will be respected domestically.  In other words, even 
states that have ratified international human rights treaties might not respect the human rights of their 
citizens. 18   A state may subscribe to an international agreement merely as a symbolic gesture, or as a 
superficial expression of a presumed interest in combating injustice and promoting human rights.  In reality, 
there is no reliable association between treaty ratification and respect for human rights.19  The effectiveness of 
treaties is conditional on state compliance, which is in turn dependent on the effective functioning of 
democracy and civil society.20  In their quantitative research, Hanfer-Bruton and Tsutsui provide evidence to 
show that: 
[H]uman rights laws are most effective in stable or consolidated 
democracies, or in states with strong civil society activism.  If so, treaties 
may be failing to make a difference in those states most in need of 
reform—the world’s worst abusers—even though they have been the 
targets of the human rights regime from the very beginning.21  
According to Hanfer-Bruton and Tsutsui, international agreements may be effective in states that have strong 
civil societies.22   In such contexts, civil society constantly lobbies for reform and monitors government 
compliance with international treaties.23  In repressive states, civil society advocates can operate only within 
the margins of allocated space, utilizing various mechanisms to mobilize for reform and effect change.24  
However, most repressive states lack the two principal interdependent conditions for genuine implementation 
of human rights law: democratic mechanisms through which the promise of human rights norms can be 
effectuated, and civil society institutions capable of pressing for the implementation of those norms.25  When 
neither condition is present, international human rights law is stripped of its tools and its potential.26  As a 
result, not only does ratification of human rights treaties by repressive regimes fail to guarantee better respect 
for human rights, it also risks providing those regimes with a political fig leaf to conceal violations of human 
rights.27  
While some human rights scholars have been optimistic about the effectiveness of human rights law 
and its contribution to the promotion of human rights in repressive societies,28 others have offered evidence 
to the contrary,29 demonstrating the conditional effectiveness of human rights law.30  The latter tend to doubt 
states’ actual compliance with international human rights law which, “if it takes place at all, may well happen 
sporadically and in fits and starts.”31  In this view, even if international law is actually implemented in 
repressive states, it will not produce results within a short period of time—certainly not at the time of 
                                                
18 Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941–89 (2002). 
19 Oona A. Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 199, 
199–215 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 






26 SCHABAS, supra note 14. 
27 James Raymond Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG. 65 (2008). 
28 Hanfer-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 16. 
29 SCHABAS, supra note 14. 
30 Hanfer-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 16. 
31 Id. at 409. 
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ratification, nor during the first few years after ratification.32  On the contrary, if actual compliance with 
international law takes place at all, it does so sporadically, it takes a long period of time to take effect, and it 
must generally converge with the interests of the state.33 
The status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
1979 (“CEDAW”) in the countries that have ratified it offers a helpful example of the gulf between 
ratification and implementation.34  To date, 189 of the 194 diverse UN member states have ratified CEDAW, 
which enshrines the basic political, civil, cultural, economic, and social human rights of women.35  Among the 
ratifying countries are some of the world’s most liberal democracies—such as Switzerland, Sweden, and 
France—as well as nations with regimes that are notoriously repressive of women’s rights, such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.36  Saudi Arabia ratified CEDAW in September 2000, expressing its 
commitment to protecting and promoting the rights of Saudi women while highlighting its reservations to 
several of the convention’s articles.37  Fourteen years later, women in Saudi Arabia still suffer from gross 
structural inequality and gender-based biases.38  Domestic laws regulating citizenship rights, inheritance, and 
personal status continue to disadvantage Saudi women, who are still unable to enjoy the basic right of driving 
a vehicle based solely on their gender.39  Like other international legal instruments, CEDAW is not self-
executing; it provides a blueprint for states to follow in order to promote women’s human rights.  Moreover, 
the international community cannot hold states accountable for their failure to respect their obligations under 
the treaty, because CEDAW does not provide the necessary accountability mechanisms to do so.40  As a 
result, ratification of CEDAW alone does not automatically bring about more equal rights for women.  As is 
the case with other international human rights documents, there are often gaps between a state’s ratification, 
and the actual enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the treaty by its subjects. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran provides us with another example. 41   In 1968, on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Tehran hosted the first United Nations 
International Conference on Human Rights, which declared that the “members of the international 
community fulfill their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
                                                
32 Id. at 407–25 (The “Burton model” was designed to assess the effectiveness of international treaties.  Burton 
looked at the extent of states’ implementation of the ICCPR and Convention Against Torture to examine the 
effectiveness of international documents.  The findings showed that after one year of ratification of an international 
treaty, states were no more likely to adopt legal reforms).   
33 Hanfer-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 16, at 407–25. 
34 Saudi Arabia: End Driving Ban for Women, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 24, 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/24/saudi-arabia-end-driving-ban-women.  
35 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). 
36  See United Nations Treaty Collection Chapter IV Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015) (listing all parties to CEDAW). 
37 Id. 
38 Christoph Wilcke, Steps of the Devil: Denial of Women’s and Girls’ Rights to Sport in Saudi Arabia, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, Feb. 15, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/02/15/steps-devil/denial-womens-and-girls-rights-sport-
saudi-arabia. 
39 Saudi Arabia: End Driving Ban for Women, supra note 34. 
40  Wilcke, supra note 38.  See also UNITED NATIONS, supra note 36 (noting, however, that some would 
characterize the existence of the CEDAW Committee as an “accountability mechanism” because women can bring 
individual complaints against their state).   
41 The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/policy-studies/research-projects-and-policy-studies/the-rulac-war-
report (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (listing the treaties to which the Islamic Republic of Iran has signed on as a party). 
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political or other opinions.”42  It further emphasized that the primary aim of the United Nations in the sphere 
of human rights:  
[I]s the achievement by each individual of the maximum freedom and 
dignity.  For the realization of this objective, the laws of every country 
should grant each individual, irrespective of race, language, religion or 
political belief, freedom of expression, of information, of conscience and of 
religion, as well as the right to participate in the political, economic, cultural 
and social life of his country.43  
Contrary to the rhetorical value of this proclamation made four decades ago, Iran is one of the ten countries 
that practice the most state censorship.44  The report published by the Committee to Protect Journalists claims 
that Iran maintains one of the toughest Internet censorship regimes in the world.45  A review of the Reporters 
Without Borders 2015 World Press Freedom Index shows that Iran has continued to fall in the index since 
2003.46  It is currently ranked 173 out of 180 countries surveyed.47  Human Rights Watch describes the status 
of human rights in Iran as dire.48  In 2014, Iran was considered one of the biggest jailers in the world of 
journalists, bloggers, and social media activists. 49   Notably, it inflicted the second highest number of 
executions in the world after China, including the execution of the largest number of juvenile offenders.50  
The discrepancy between treaty ratification and implementation is not limited to non-Western signatories.  
For example, out of 178 countries surveyed in 2012 and 2013 on press freedoms, for example, the United 
States was ranked 132nd.51 
C. When The Language Of Rights Runs Dry 
In authoritarian societies characterized by strict censorship and restrictions of civil rights and liberties, 
international treaties cannot be expected to effectively challenge repression, or to minimize stifling 
bureaucracy, nepotism, bribery, or corruption.  Legal channels for redress can be inadequate; they may prove 
ineffective in preventing state practices that discriminate against people on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin.52 
In the most repressive regimes, widespread civic frustration is often overlooked, and calls for 
adherence to human rights tend to be ignored.  Disadvantaged citizens continue to live on the margins and 
                                                
42 PROCLAMATION OF TEHERAN, FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
TEHERAN, 22 APRIL TO 13 MAY 1968 4, UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION A/CONF. 32/41 (1968), available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/fatchr/Final_Act_of_TehranConf.pdf. 
43 Id. 
44  The 2015 List of 10 Most Censored Countries, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, 
https://cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
45 Id. 
46  2015 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2015# (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
47 Id. 
48  World Report 2015: Iran, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-
chapters/iran (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (reporting that between January and October 2014, the Iranian government had executed at least 200 
prisoners, and that in 2014, the United States executed 33 people by lethal injections composed of experimental drugs). 
51 In 2015 the United States ranked in 49th place, behind Niger and Malta.  See 2015 World Press Freedom Index, 
supra note 46.  
52 UDHR, supra note 2. 
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endure brutal forms of injustice.53  Civil society is generally weak and confined to addressing certain discrete 
injustices or to tackling the absence of the rule of law.54 
In Tunisia, for example, prior to the 2010 Jasmine Revolution,55 its constitution and accompanying 
domestic law contained language that projected the notion of a liberal, democratic, and modern legal 
system—legal language that theoretically enshrined political rights and freedoms of association and 
expression.56 
When this aspirational legislation was actually applied by Zine El ‘Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia 
appeared to be among the leading countries in the Middle East when it came to respecting civil and social 
rights.57  It introduced progressive legislation that enshrined the rule of law and respect for human dignity.  
However, there remained a profound gap between legal rhetoric and practice.58 
The trajectory of human rights in Tunisia during the twenty-three year-long dictatorship of President 
Ben Ali illustrates how a government that ratified more international treaties than any Middle Eastern country 
gradually subverted the language of law as part of a strategy to consolidate absolute power.   A long list of 
treaties was ratified by the Ben Ali regime, including the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1988; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1992; the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1997; the Convention Concerning the Prohibition 
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 2000; the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, 2000; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, 2008.59  All of these treaties were drafted with the aim of advancing the status 
and rights of women, children, refugees, and minorities.60 
                                                
53 See 2009 Human Rights Report: Tunisia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
LAB., Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136081.htm (stating that nongovernmental 
institutions and international organizations reported governmental violations of human rights, specifically those inflicted 
by the security forces, including torture, lengthy pretrial detention, forced interrogation, and sexual assault); see also 
BRIEG POWEL & LARBI SADIKI, EUROPE AND TUNISIA: DEMOCRATIZATION VIA ASSOCIATION 137 (2010). 
54 Christopher Alexander, Back from the Democratic Brink: Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia, 27 MIDDLE 
EAST REP. (1997), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer205/authoritarianism-civil-society-tunisia.  See also Veronica Baker, 
Undergraduate Honors Thesis, The Role of Civil Society in the Tunisian Democratic Transition, CU SCHOLAR, U. OF COLO. 1, 
24–35 (2015), http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2212&context=honr_theses (providing further 
information about the history of the civil society in Tunisia.  For example, the ruling regime greatly limited the freedom 
of association.  While formally, the law guaranteed the freedom of expression and association Article 8 of the 
Constitution of Tunisia of 1959, in reality civil society was tightly controlled by the government). 
55 Eva Bellin, Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions: Possibilities of Political Transformation in the Middle East?, 50 
MIDDLE EAST BRIEF 1, 5–7 (2011), http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB50.pdf. One of the 
fundamental calls of the revolution was to halt corruption and restore the dignity of the people of Tunisia.  The Jasmine 
Revolution is also known by Tunisians as Thawrt Al-Karama or “The Dignity Revolution.”  
56 See generally Habib Ayeb, Social and Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution: The Alfa Grass Revolution, 38 REV. 
OF AFR. POL. ECON. 467 (2011). 
57  See AMNESTY INT’L MEDIA BRIEFING, TUNISIA: ROUTINE MUZZLING OF DISSENT MARS UPCOMING 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 23RD OCTOBER 2009, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE30/013/2009/en/. 
58  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TUNISIA REPORT (2009), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160078.pdf.  
59 See generally Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – Tunisia, U. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-tunisia.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
60 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1997: EVENTS OF 1996, 306–07 (1997). 
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Even domestically, Ben Ali adopted the language of reform when he came to power in 1987.61  He 
introduced a set of laws and policies that enshrined more liberties,62 such as releasing most of the public 
figures who were arrested during Habib Bourguiba’s reign, repatriating opposition members in exile, and 
increasing state funding to political parties and their publications.63  Ben Ali also allowed radio and television 
stations to broadcast calls for prayers (“ezan”), which were banned during the Bourguiba era, and permitted 
the religious supreme council to publish a religious magazine, Al-Hedaya.64 
However, after Ben Ali was elected for a second successive term, his interests shifted from what 
appeared to be promoting social and economic rights to building a centralized state regime.65  Ben Ali 
gradually reshaped the state from a civil democracy to an autocratic dictatorship.66  He enhanced the role of 
the ruling party, suppressed opposition, and directly supervised the function of brutal security apparatuses.67  
During the second term, citizens realized that the promises of alleviating poverty, combating unemployment, 
and ensuring the independence of the judiciary and separation of powers were merely re-election campaign 
slogans.68  In return, focused only on one facet of the international community’s calls for reform: he used 
their economic ranking reports to reassure the public that the ruling regime was working to advance social 
welfare, all the while ignoring all other calls for reform, including ceasing torture and respecting human 
rights.69 
Between 2000 and 2010, the gulf between the legal rhetoric of human rights and the reality of a 
legally authorized reign of terror in Tunisia continued to grow.70  The Ben Ali regime continued to ignore 
repeated condemnations by the international community;71 it used the language of law and human rights to 
justify its censorship, abuse, and repression of civic rights.72  In the name of security and combating terrorist 
threats, Ben Ali had found an opportunity to squash domestic dissent and calls for a more democratic 
system.73 
                                                
61 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR), REPORT OF THE 
OHCHR ASSESSMENT MISSION TO TUNISIA JANUARY 26 – FEBRUARY 2, 2011, 
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OHCHR Report].  
62  Alejandro Sanchez, Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability May Not Last–An International Security Perspective, 9 
DEFENCE STUD. 85 (2009), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702430802666660. 
63 MOSHE DAYAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN STUDIES, MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY 
SURVEY XXIV 568–71 (Bruce Maddy-Weitzman ed., 2003). 
64 Nebahat Tanriverdi, Background of the Tunisian Revolution, 3 ALTERNATIVE POL. 557 (2011). 
65 OHCHR, supra note 61. 
66 Id. 
67 ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ARAB SPRING: RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 72 (Larbi Sadiki ed., 
2014).  
68  Tunisia Country Summary, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS (Freedom House), 2007, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2007/tunisia. 
69 See CORINNA MULLIN, Tunisia’s Revolution and the Domestic-International Nexus, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
THE ARAB SPRING: RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 94–95 (2014) (assessing the Tunisian uprising from the 
international perspective). 
70  POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 242 (Rex Brynen, Bahgat 
Korany & Paul Noble, 1995). 
71  Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Tunisia: Abuses Continue Despite Official Denial, (July 2, 2008), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde30/010/2008/en/. 
72  See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2008: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS 299 (2008), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=pol10%2F001%2F2008&language=en. 
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The Ben Ali government was among the most repressive countries in the world in terms of freedom 
of speech.74  In 2008, Tunisia was ranked 175th out of 195 countries for protecting or permitting free speech 
in a survey conducted by Freedom House.75  Clearly, the numerous international treaties adopted by the 
Tunisian government proved to be ineffective as tools to ensure freedom of expression for the Tunisian 
people.  And even though the principle of freedom of expression had been enshrined in the Tunisian 
Constitution, 76  the country’s Press Code of 1975 emptied those free speech provisions of their liberal 
meaning:77 the Code required all publications to be vetted by the Ministry of Interior before distribution.78  
The Ministry had to approve each publication and issue a receipt permitting publishers to release and 
disseminate the publication under consideration.79  Generally, such receipts were not issued in accordance 
with specific criteria in a timely manner, but rather, were bureaucratically delayed and subjected to changing 
and nontransparent criteria.80  Furthermore, the Press Code classified defamation against state institutions 
and “offending” the President of the Republic as criminal offences.81  The law employed the deliberately 
broad term with no definition or interpretive guidance as to the kind of acts that could be deemed offensive.82  
Under such politically and socially repressive conditions, state control impeded the efforts of citizens and 
human rights advocates to express dissent.  Constitutional law and human rights guarantees were ineffective 
tools for protecting citizens’ civil liberties.83 
Authoritarian regimes not only rule with an explicitly iron fist, but also preserve wealth and power 
through complex, less conspicuous tools of social discipline and control.  Modern state power tends to be 
manifested and enacted through the creation of a culture of dependency whereby citizens are managed 
through fear, hunger, consumerism, and intimidation; 84  the exploitation of available natural and human 
resources; and—importantly—control of the language of the law.  By strategic deployment and manipulation 
                                                
74 Tunisia Country Summary, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Freedom House), 2008, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/tunisia. 
75 Id. 
76 Tunisia Const., art. 8 (1959). 




78 See The Press Code of 1975. The Tunisian government tightly controlled all means of disseminating news 
and information.  For example, in 2007, the government blocked citizens’ access to public video-sharing spaces such as 
YouTube and DailyMotion, simply because both sites contained materials regarding Tunisian political prisoners.  As an 
alternative, activists succeeded in linking information and videos about fundamental rights and civil liberties to the image 
of the Tunisian presidential palace through Google Earth.  See Ayeb, supra note 56. 
79 The Ben Ali regime was committed to silencing voices of opposition.  In 2004, soon after its establishment, 
the government blocked Nawaat, a collective blog, which strived to cast out collective frustration in Tunisia, and 
contributed to channeling the opposition to Ben Ali’s regime.  The blog remained blocked until 2011.  See STATE POWER 
2.0: AUTHORITARIAN ENTRENCHMENT AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WORLD 50–52 (Muzammil M. Hussain & Philip 
N. Howard eds., 2013); see also LYOMBE S. EKO, NEW MEDIA, OLD REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE 
COMMUNICATION LAW AND POLICY 149 (2012). 
80 See Alexander, supra note 54.  
81  Tunisia Country Summary, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS (Freedom House), 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/tunisia_2012.pdf. 
82  Id. 
83  See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2013: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS 271–272 (2013), http://files.amnesty.org/air13/AmnestyInternational_AnnualReport2013_complete_en.pdf 
(documenting human rights violations under the Ben Ali regime and demanding legal reform and adherence to 
international human rights standards for nearly a decade).  
84  Marwan M. Kraidy, The Body As Medium in the Digital Age: Challenges and Opportunities, 10 COMM. & 
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 285 (2013). 
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of power, states portray a “façade democracy”85 and utilize the law to justify government action,86 thereby 
devaluing the power of law to effect transformative change.  The language of human rights law—embodied in 
international agreements and even in domestic law—offers repressive states a powerful tool to legitimize 
repressive practices.87  
The Ben Ali regime used the introduction of progressive laws and the ratification of international 
treaties as political propaganda, aimed at depicting the regime as a progressive, rights-respecting democracy.88  
This tactic was designed not only to placate the international community, but also to pacify the discontented 
Tunisian people.89  However, it ensured the centralization of power in the hands of the presidency and his 
security apparatus.90  It was subsequently used to repress Tunisian citizens.91  The Ben Ali regime rejected in 
practice the legal principle of political diversity and the right of citizens to assemble or form political parties.92  
In 2003, for example, the Tunisian government passed counterterrorism legislation with the purported aim of 
enhancing security and combating terrorism, named The Law of 2003 Concerning Supporting International Efforts to 
Combat Terrorism and Forbid Money Laundering. 93   Between 2003 and 2010,94 under the guise of combating 
terrorism, the Tunisian government arrested and tortured hundreds of citizens, 95  charging them with 
affiliation with terrorist organizations and incitement to terrorism.96  Under the rubric of complementing the 
international community’s efforts to combat terrorism, the law was used as a means to justify torture, illegal 
and/or secret detention, and to suppress any form of political dissent.97  
The 2003 counterterrorism law opened the door for the judiciary and apparatus to accuse,98 detain, 
interrogate, and try “terrorism” suspects,99 and it did so through deliberately and ambiguously worded text to 
                                                
85 Larbi Sadiki, Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Facade Democracy, 9.4 DEMOCRATIZATION 122, 123–25 
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87 Laura Bazzicalupo, Imagination, Imaginary and the Bioeconomic Turn of Cognitive Capitalism, in THE POLITICS OF 
IMAGINATION 86, 86–91 (Chiara Bottici & Benoît Challand eds., 2011). 
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32–33 (Nathan J. Brown & Emad El-din Shahin eds., 2010).  
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94  Human Rights Watch World Report 2009: Events of 2008, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 517, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Watch World Report]. 
95 Alexis Arieff, Tunisia: Recent Developments and Policy Issues, 5.2 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 274 (2011), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155560.pdf.  
96 Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Tunisia: Abuses Continue Despite Official Denial (July 22, 2008). 
97 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/14/Add.1; GAOR, 20th Sess. (Mar. 14, 
2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-14-
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98 Human Rights Watch World Report, supra note 94, at 518. 
99 Tunisia: Counterterror Law Endangers Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jul. 31, 2015, 
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make the scope of potential “terrorist” offenses as broad as possible.100  Tunisians were sentenced under the 
law classifying a myriad of individual acts as “offences of terror,” such as growing a beard, dressing in a 
specific manner, or accessing prohibited websites.101  The UN Human Rights Council documented 3,000 
cases in which citizens were sentenced under the 2003 law for such “offences of terror.” 102   The UN 
repeatedly expressed serious concerns regarding the 2003 law’s incompatibility with international law, 
particularly the due process and freedoms of expression and belief provisions enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR),103 which Tunisia ratified without reservation in 1969.  The 
UN stressed that the counterterrorism law—primarily Article 4 104 —did not contain precise or explicit 
definitions of terrorism, terrorist groups, incitement to terrorism, and financing of terrorism.  In effect, the 
2003 law was used by the regime as a tool of oppression against Tunisian citizens.105 
Civil society under Ben Ali’s regime was strictly confined. Although more than 9,800 voluntary and 
national organizations were officially registered as of 2009, few of them were able to operate independently.106  
The Ministry of the Interior had de jure and de facto control over civil society organizations.107  According to 
Freedom House: “Most associations were service-oriented and coopted by the regime, and did not foster the 
kind of horizontal membership that contributes to a civic culture.”108  The state “maintain[ed] a dominant and 
intrusive role in civil society, [and created] exceptionally restrictive conditions [. . . .]”109  As a strategy to 
navigate the needs of the international community, the regime allocated a constrained, artificial space for the 
functioning of civil society. 110 By metaphorically attempting to cover the sun with a sieve, Ben Ali enabled the 
authoritarian regime to appear more democratic, thereby making it more resilient and resistant to calls for 
change. 
International advocacy organizations such as Amnesty International repeatedly addressed the human 
rights violations perpetrated by the Tunisian government. 111  Many statements, reports, and studies were 
released detailing the litany of human rights abuses and calling for urgent state action to halt the abuses and 
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106 FOUND FOR THE FUTURE, STUDY ON CIVIL SOCIETY IN TUNISIA 8–11 (2013) (showing that by 2009, the 
exact number of civil society organizations was 9,843.  1.4% of the overall percentage of civil society organizations in 
Tunisia worked in the field of law and human rights). 
107 Id. at 16. 
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111 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, TUNISIA CONTINUING ABUSES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY (2009). 
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promote respect for the rule of law.112  The Ben Ali regime portrayed Tunisia as a country where the rule of 
law prevailed,113 but Amnesty International described a very different picture:  
The Tunisian authorities continue to carry out arbitrary arrests and detentions, allow torture and use 
unfair trials, all in the name of the fight against terrorism.  This is the harsh reality behind the official 
rhetoric.114  
An Amnesty International report released in June 2008 documented a pattern of human rights 
violations in Tunisia that included: 
Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention and enforced disappearances; 
torture and other ill-treatment; unfair trials, including before military courts; 
and abuses in prisons as well as abuses against Tunisian nationals forcibly 
returned from abroad.115 
The Tunisian government rejected Amnesty International’s report, arguing that the allegations had 
not been properly investigated and denying that “security officials are allowed to abuse the law with 
impunity.”116  Amnesty International issued several statements and reports in 2008, including Tunisia: Abuses 
Continue Despite Official Denial 117  and In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia, 118  and held a press 
conference in Paris calling on the Ben Ali regime to halt human rights abuses and to uphold the law.119 
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PROSPECTS 5–8 (Nouri Gana ed., 2013). 
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In this context, we see how the language of law can run dry.120  Autocratic regimes have the power to 
deconstruct the language of legal reform.  By assaulting and restricting the language of law, repressive regimes 
unmake, destroy, and empty legal arguments of their transformative potential. 
III. WHEN THE BODY YIELDS: SELF-IMMOLATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF DISSENT                                 
 Self-immolation is an example of bodily self-destruction, a radical tool of last resort used to 
materialize and communicate pain whereby the distressed body reclaims power to reject its subjugation.  The 
struggling body not only rejects its subordination by the state, but also becomes an agent that reclaims rights 
and liberties through its own death.  Through the logic of corporeal emancipation, oppressed and even 
quotidian actors may contest the failure of the rational arguments rooted in the language of human rights, 
catalyze legal, social, and cultural change where rational arguments fail and render the voice of the voiceless 
legible. 
 The second part of this Article examines the power of the human body to spur political and legal 
action.  It analyzes the 2010 self-immolation of Tarek Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia, which sparked an 
unprecedented wave of protests across Arab countries, leading to what came to be known as the “Arab 
Spring.”  It contends that when human rights-based arguments are exhausted, space is created for alternative 
strategies of resistance.  Mobilized and deployed as a tool of resistance, human bodies become the 
“argument.”  It offers an understanding of the body—and its annihilation—as a form of argument. It 
explores the difficulty of communicating, expressing, and understanding pain. This part addresses the 
question: What distinguishes the failure of law’s rationality from the body’s surrender as a moral force to 
challenge state power?  At what point does the collective inability to challenge state power through legal 
means make the use of the body-in-pain inevitable? 
A. Tarek Mohammad Bouazizi 
 Tarek Mohammad Bouazizi was a twenty-six-year-old street vendor who sold fruit in Sidi Bouzaid, 
an impoverished city in Tunisia that lies 190 miles south of the capital Tunis.  On December 17, 2010, he 
used paint thinner to set himself ablaze outside the Sidi Bouzaid municipal office121 in protest of the crushing 
poverty and the unrelenting political harassment and oppression he had endured.122 
                                                                                                                                                       
prisoners-2010-03-1/. 
120 Virginia Woolf, On Being Ill, in THE ESSAYS OF VIRGINIA WOOLF 194 (Andrew McNellie ed., 1994) (“Finally, 
to hinder the description of illness in literature, there is the poverty of the language.  English, which can express the 
thoughts of Hamlet and the tragedy of Lear, has no words for the shiver and the headache.  It has all grown one 
way.  The merest schoolgirl, when she falls in love, has Shakespeare or Keats to speak her mind for her; but let a sufferer 
try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry.  There is nothing ready made for him.  He is 
forced to coin words himself, and, taking his pain in one hand, and a lump of pure sound in the other (as perhaps the 
people of Babel did in the beginning), so to crush them together that a brand new word in the end drops out.  Probably 
it will be something laughable.”). 
121 Bouazizi was not the only Tunisian who used his body to express his disenfranchisement.  On December 
22, 2010, in the town of Sidi Bouzid, 24-year-old Lahseen Naji was electrocuted after climbing a high-voltage electricity 
pole to cry out his “hunger and joblessness.”  Ramzi Al-Abboudi committed suicide because of his deteriorating 
financial situation and his inability to repay a business loan he took from the country’s micro-credit solidarity program.  
See Sadiki Larbi, Tunisia: The Battle of Sidi Bouzid, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, Dec. 27, 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2010/12/20101227142811755739.html. 
122  Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. 
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 Bouazizi’s plight reflected that of a much larger population that exists on the margins of Tunisian 
society, enduring the injustices of the ruling regime.  After leaving school to work as a street vendor at the age 
of ten, Bouazizi had been the primary breadwinner for his family.123  Following the death of his father, 
Bouazizi worked several jobs to support his mother and siblings.124  He was targeted over the course of many 
years by municipal police officers who constantly harassed him for bribes.  When he refused, he was 
subjected to arbitrary fines, confiscation of his wares, and beating by officials.125 
 On the day of his self-immolation, a policewoman in the public market allegedly slapped Bouazizi in 
the face,126 and her two assistants had thrown away his cart and all of his belongings.  His goods were 
confiscated and he was fined for selling vegetables in the street without a permit.  The fine was the equivalent 
of a full day’s income.127 Bouazizi, according to witness, cried and asked the policewoman, “[w]hy are you 
doing this to me? . . . I’m a simple person, and I just want to work.” 128  In agony, he went to city hall and 
requested to speak to an official, but no clerk paid attention to his demand; they minimized the incident and 
asked him to “[g]o home [and] forget about it.” 129  Bouazizi returned to the market and expressed his 
frustration to his fellow vendors; he told them that he would not remain mute and that he would “let the 
world know how unfairly they were being treated, how corrupt the system was.”130 
 This humiliating public incident pushed him over the edge.  It undoubtedly served to remind 
Bouazizi that as a cart vendor and as a citizen, he was unrecognized, subjugated, and marginalized. Even 
worse, he was not afforded sufficient autonomy to earn a living.  Bouazizi succumbed to desperation by 
contemplating suicide;131 he set himself on fire outside the city hall while crying out, “How do you expect me 
to make a living?”132  His act generated an enormous wave of solidarity.133  The spectacle of a body in flames 
prompted thousands of people already disenchanted with the regime to shout in a united voice, Ash-shaʻb 
yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām: 134   “The people demand the overthrow of the regime!”  Tens of thousands of 
marginalized, discontent, and enraged citizens—mostly young people, women, children, the elderly, and the 
                                                
123 Peter Beaumont, Mohammed Bouazizi: The Dutiful Son Whose Death Changed Tunisia’s Fate, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 
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124  Kareem Fahim, Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, 
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125  Hernando De Soto, The Real Mohamed Bouazizi, FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE, Dec. 11, 2011, 
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126 Fedia Hamdi, the Tunisian market inspector, was accused of slapping Mohammad Bouazizi. Hamdi denied 
the charges, and in April 2011—after 111 days of incarceration—she was released from jail on grounds of lack of 
evidence.  See Elizabeth Day, Fedia Hamdi’s Slap Which Sparked a Revolution ‘Didn't Happen’, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 23, 2011, 
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131 AMIN MAALOUF, DISORDERED WORLD XI (2012). 
132  Bob Simon, How a Slap Sparked Tunisia’s revolution, CBS NEWS, Feb. 22, 2011, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-a-slap-sparked-tunisias-revolution-22-02-2011/. 
133 After Bouazizi was transferred to the hospital in Sfax, his fellow vendors and family members protested 
outside city hall; they threw stones at the building while shouting, “Mohammad was oppressed, he was upset and 
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Bouazizi, TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 14, 2011, 
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unemployed—marched nonviolently through the streets of Tunisia chanting, “Dégage, dégage, dégage!” 
(“Get lost!”), expressing their outrage and calling on the government to step down. 135   Bouazizi’s act 
ultimately sparked a movement for change, leading to revolutions that toppled dictatorships across the Arab 
world—a phenomenon that came to be known as the Arab Spring.136  It sparked massive waves of bodies 
marching against injustice in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.137 
 Why was Bouazizi’s spontaneous act of desperation—the self-induced spectacle of a burning body—
a more effective catalyst in challenging the power of repressive Arab governments than the language of 
human rights law that the international community had worked so committedly to ratify and implement 
globally? 
B. Analyzing The Corporeal Logic Of The Oppressed Body 
Human beings need to be recognized.  By being recognized, they exist. Life is theatrical 
performance. 
—Jeon  Tae-il   
The use of the corporeal body as a means of political protest represents an ancient form of 
resistance.138  Throughout history, various groups and individuals have used their bodies as a mechanism of 
rebellion.  Inflicting pain and suffering on one’s own body, as in the hunger strike, has been a familiar mode 
of resistance against state power.  In many countries and throughout history, revolutionaries have used their 
bodies to communicate rejection of injustice; self-immolation and hunger strikes are two modes of political 
resistance.139  The Cuban poet Pedro Luis Boitel died on day fifty-three of his hunger strike in 1972; he was 
demanding humane treatment in prison.  Perhaps the most impassioned hunger striker is Mahatma Gandhi, 
also known as the father of the Indian nation, who fasted seventeen times to protest British rule as he led 
India’s freedom movement.140  The mass suicide of Indian farmers who were facing crop failure in the midst 
                                                
135  Andrea Khalil, The Language of the Political Crowd in Tunisia, AFR. FUTURES, Dec. 19, 2012, 
http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/12/19/the-language-of-the-political-crowd-in-tunisia-2/.  
136 Following Bouazizi’s death, a number of other self-immolation incidents took place in the Arab World, 
namely in Algeria when Mohsen Bouterfif set himself ablaze outside the mayor’s office in January 2011.  According to 
the BBC News, six months after Bouazizi’s death, at least 107 Tunisians tried to commit suicide by setting themselves 
alight. See, Tunisia One Year On: New Trend of Self-Immolations, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16526462. 
137 This Article does not in any way claim that the “Arab Spring” is a resounding success, however it recognizes 
that it has changed the dynamics between citizens and state and helped break the chains of fear that people had, which 
isn't a small thing.  It is undeniable that the unprecedented act of self-immolation created a dynamic that helped people 
overcome their fear and demand human rights changes—it created a situation that didn't exist before. 
138  Jonathan Rugman, Sidi Bouzid: Roots of the Tunisia Revolution, CHANNEL 4, Jan. 20, 2011, 
http://www.channel4.com/news/sidi-bouzid-roots-of-the-tunisia-revolution. 
139 An example of such resistance was seen in 1981, when the Irish Republican Army prisoners, Robert Gerard 
“Bobby Sands” (also a member of the British parliament) and Francis Hughes launched a hunger strike to demand that 
they be recognized as political prisoners rather than “mere” criminals; the Thatcher government refused to negotiate, 
and the two men starved to death, which sparked riots in many areas in Northern Ireland.  See The Search for Peace, Hunger 
Strike 1980-82, BBC NEWS LONDON, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/hunger_strike.stm. 
140 Pramod Kumar Srivastava, Resistance And Repression in India: The Hunger Strike at the Andaman Cellular Jail in 
1933, 7.2 CRIME, HIST. & SOCIETIES 81 (2003). 
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of the highest levels of inflation and government crackdown illustrates how collective bodies mobilize to 
express their desperation and rejection of injustice.141  
The use of self-immolation as a political act by Tibetan Buddhist monks has been well 
documented.142   Thich Quang Duc of Vietnam burned himself to death in 1963 to protest against the 
prosecution of Buddhists by the South Vietnamese government; Polish accountant Ryszard Siwiec set a 
precedent in Polish history when he self-immolated in 1968 to protest the Warsaw Pact military alliances’ 
invasion of Czechoslovakia;143  Jeon Tae-il, the first self-immolator in the modern history of South Korea,144 
set himself alight in front of the market in Seoul to protest the dire working conditions in the garment 
industry in 1970.145 
In the Arab world, self-immolation as a radical political strategy appears to have been unheard of 
until December 2010. 146  Criminal laws in Tunisia,147 Syria,148 Jordan,149 and Palestine150 punish anyone who 
                                                
141  1,500 Farmers Commit Mass Suicide In India, THE INDEPENDENT, April 15, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/1500-farmers-commit-mass-suicide-in-india-1669018.html (In 2009, 
over 1,500 farmers in India collectively committed a suicide as a result of their failure in paying off their debts).   
142  Michael Biggs, Dying Without Killing: Self-Immolations 1963-2002, in MAKING SENSE OF SUICIDE MISSIONS 173 
(Diego Gambetta ed., 2005). 
143 M. MARK STOLARIK, THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE WARSAW PACT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 
1968: FORTY YEARS LATER 25 (2010). 
144 Not every political self-immolation brings about change or spark a revolution.  Recently in the United States 
of America, a number of incidents occurred without igniting a wave of uprisings.  For example, in October 2013, John 
Constantino set himself ablaze on the Washington National Mall.  See John Constantino Identified as Man Who Set Himself on 
Fire at National Mall, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/04/john-
constantino_n_4046947.html. On the day after, another man committed suicide outside the Capitol building in 
Washington, D.C., while holding a sign stating “Tax The 1%.”  Neither incident ignited a revolution in the United States.  
See, Man Who Shot Himself Dead on Steps of Capitol Was Carrying ‘Tax The 1%’ Sign, THE DAILY MAIL, April 12, 2015, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3035712/Man-shot-dead-steps-Capitol-carrying-Tax-1-sign.html.  
An older example, is the case of Bruce Mayrock, a twenty-year old student at the School of General Studies at Columbia 
University of set himself on fire outside the United Nations Head Quarters to protest against the war in Biafra.  See GS 
Student, 20, Immolates Himself in Front of U.N., COLUMBIA DAILY SPECTATOR, VOLUME CXIII, Number 118 (June 3, 1969), 
http://spectatorarchive.library.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/columbia?a=d&d=cs19690603-01.2.8&e=-------en-20--1--txt-
txIN------#.  
145  Jeon Tae-il’s Burning Himself to Death, KOREA DEMOCRACY FOUND. NO. 1, 
http://www.kdemocracy.or.kr/mail/newsletter/mail_article_200508_01.html (last visited on 18 July 2015). 
146 Mattias Gardell, So Costly Sacrifice Upon The Alter Of Freedom: Human Bombs, Suicide Attacks, And Patriot Heroes, 
2 J. OF RELIGION AND VIOLENCE  168, 168–202 (2014). In the Arab world, the body has been used as a medium to 
bring about political change in other ways. Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons for decades have been 
resorting to collective hunger strikes (“the Battle of Empty Intestines”) to call attention to imprisonment conditions that 
violate international norms and to demand recognition as political detainees and face charges or be released, while 
realizing that the strategy they use carries with it the risk of death.  According to Michael Biggs, there is no 
documentation to show that self-immolation was practiced in the Middle East and North Africa.  Biggs’ study mapped 
self-immolation between the years 1963 and 2002.  See Biggs, supra note 141. 
147 The Penal Gazette of Tunisia No. 79 of 1913, Article 206 (stipulates five years’ punishment for anyone who 
intentionally assists another to commit suicide). 
148 Syrian Criminal Law No. 148 of 1949, Article 539 (punishes anyone who assists in a suicide in any way—
whether by giving instructions, providing emotional and psychological support, or facilitating the act itself.  The law 
imposes a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment if the suicide is successful.  If the attempt is unsuccessful, the law 
stipulates a sentence of imprisonment between three months and two years). 
149  Criminal Law of Jordan No. 16 of 1960, Article 339 (punishes anyone who assists in a suicide by 
imprisonment for a term ranging from three to fifteen years). 
150 In Palestine, the relevant criminal law is the Jordanian Criminal Law No. 16 of 1960.  The law applies the 
same stipulations as the Jordanian legislation.  
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assists others to commit suicide.151  Islam—the majority religion in the Arab world—classifies killing the self 
or innocent others as a grave sin.152   
Islam honors the human body, reaffirming its sacredness and the religious duty to maintain its moral 
and physical well-being. 153  Various verses of the Qur’an154 enshrine the sacredness of life155 and the body.156  
Islam perceives the body as a gift from God; it is His offering and He alone can give it and take it.157  In this 
view, human beings do not possess any authority to damage their bodies or terminate their lives.158 
The sacredness of the body as envisioned in both Islamic 159  and Arab cultures renders Tarek 
Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation all the more powerful and underscores the radical desperation that it 
expressed.160  Under tremendous pain, humiliation, and desperation, he resorted to disregarding powerful 
cultural and religious taboos.161 
                                                
151 Penal laws in Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine punish any act that assists, encourages, or inspires others 
to commit suicide.  Article 206, Law No. 79 of 1913 (promulgating the Penal Code of Tunisia), stipulates five years’ 
punishment for anyone who intentionally assists another to commit suicide.  Article 339 of Law No. 16 of 1960 
(promulgating the Criminal Code of Jordan) punishes anyone who assists a suicide by imprisonment for a term ranging 
from three to fifteen years.  In Palestine, the relevant criminal law is the Jordanian Criminal Law No. 16 of 1960. The 
law applies the same stipulations as the Jordanian legislation. Article 539 of the Syrian Law No. 148 of 1949 
(promulgating the Criminal Code of Syria) punishes anyone who assists a suicide in any way—whether by giving 
instructions, providing emotional and psychological support, or facilitating the act itself.  The law imposes a maximum 
of ten years’ imprisonment if the suicide was successful.  If the attempt was unsuccessful, the law stipulates a sentence of 
imprisonment between three months and two years. 
152 SAHIH BUKHARI VOL. 2, BK. 23, NO. 445: A saying attributed to the Prophet Mohammad (Hadith), narrated 
by Junab, “A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so God said: My slave has caused death on 
himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise for him.” 
153  Narration of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) states “Breaking the bone of a dead person is similar (in sin) 
to breaking the bone of a living person.”  ,SUNAN ABU DAWUD, BK. 21, HADITH 119 
154 QUR’AN Surah 6:151 (“Whether open or secret; take not life, which God hath made sacred, except by way of 
justice and law: thus doth He command you, that yet may learn wisdom.”  Alongside Quranic verses, Hadiths from 
Prophet Mohammad clearly forbid suicide or the killing of others.). 
155 QUR’AN Surah 17:70 (“And verily we have honoured the children of Adam.”). 
156 QUR’AN Surah 2:195 (“And do not throw yourselves in destruction.”). 
157 QUR’AN Surah 2:28 (“How can you disbelieve? Seeing that you were dead and He gave you life. Then He will 
give you death, then again will bring you to life (on the Day of Resurrection) and then unto Him you will return.”). 
158 QUR’AN Surah 6:151 (“Come, I will rehearse what God hath (really) prohibited you from”: Join not anything 
as equal with Him; be good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of want: We provide sustenance for you and 
for them: come not nigh to shameful deeds.  Whether open or secret: take not life, which God hath made sacred, except 
by way of justice and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may learn wisdom. Qur’an). 
159 In Bouazizi’s case, there is no significant evidence that he was triggered by religious motives to search for 
martyrdom or shahada.  Bouazizi was not particularly religious, he was not a member of an organized movement, and he 
did not have any political affiliation.  He immolated himself as a last refuge of frustration and desperation, without 
anticipating the greater impact of his action.  Therefore, the religious factor does not provide a sufficiently descriptive 
framework nor does it provide us with the answer of why use of the corporal body as a political act motivated a wave for 
change. (maybe a source needed/removal needed) 
160 The usage of the sacred human body in protest of injustice raised controversies among Islamic jurists 
(Foqaha’).  Al-Azhar, the most respected religious institution in Sunni Islam, issued a statement stressing that Islam 
strictly forbids suicide for any given reason, further arguing that Shari’a Law outlaws suicide as an expression of anger or 
protest.  However, the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi expressed sympathy with those who use their 
bodies as means to revolt against injustices and classified Bouazizi’s act as one of desperation and frustration.  He 
blamed the authoritarian regimes for oppressing their citizens and triggering them to commit suicide.  Qaradawi 
considered the spectacular act of Bouazizi setting his body alight as a means of gaining freedom and a call for God to 
emancipate him and other marginalized Tunisians from the state’s oppression.  See Ahmad Muath Alkhateeb Al 
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Bouazizi’s self-immolation can be regarded not merely as an individual or private act, but rather as a 
physical expression of a broader social struggle; the ramifications of his act extended well beyond the 
boundaries of his own body.  Bouazizi was one of many citizens who faced limited opportunities and 
constant harassment by the state.  These vulnerable, powerless, and disadvantaged citizens enjoyed few, if 
any, political, economic, and civil rights and liberties.  In order to resist the injustices he experienced, Bouazizi 
was acutely aware that no alternative means were available to him, certainly no legal means.  Bouazizi was a 
victim “whose judgment and reason had been compromised by [his] experience.”162  Fully aware of the 
significance of the destruction of his body in Islamic theology, Bouazizi nonetheless utilized his corporeal 
body as a tool to give voice to his frustration.163 
The fact that he set himself on fire in a public space and in front of a public building that stood for 
the state suggests that he wished to convey the message that his action was not an individualized, private act 
of suicide or self-emancipation.  His act was resistance at the limit of the very idea of the human, thereby 
revealing the limits of the human as a rights-bearing subject in general.  While Bouazizi probably did not 
anticipate that his act would ignite a wave of change across the Arab world, his self-immolation can be 
interpreted as a political act of “last resort,” a rejection of state control and withdrawal from the broken social 
contract.  His profound pain overcame idealized spiritual notions of the sacredness of the body and the 
sinfulness of the act.164  Since the state breached its commitment to the social contract, Bouazizi in return 
manifested his suffering by breaking his “sacred” religious contract.  
IV. UNDERSTANDING WHEN BODIES-IN-PAIN BECOME THE ARGUMENT 
 
A. The Difficulty Of Communicating And Understanding Injustice 
 
This section analyzes the corporeal logic and the role of bodies-in-pain as a medium of political 
expression.  Bouazizi’s actions may offer a window into how the body can act as a tool of defiance when the 
law “runs dry.”  Although one should not assert a causal relationship between an individual act of corporeal 
protest and the launch of a mass movement, it is useful to examine the vital role of the human body as a 
medium for enacting resistance when the law proves ineffective. 
The injustice of a dictatorship is borne by the citizenry, both collectively and individually.165   The 
daily struggle that results from marginalization, disempowerment, and powerlessness, combined with the 
constraints on expressing and challenging these same injustices, generate a sense of frustration.  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
Husseini, Between the Flaps of Bouazizi and the Flights of Qaradawi, NEWS SOURCE NEEDED Aug. 24, 2011, 
http://www.qaradawi.net/articles/86-2009-12-12-10-35-10/5125-2011-08-24-09-07-14.html. 
161 Yusuf al-Qaradawi considered Bouazizi’s act as a form of Jihad Al Mathloom, what could be considered as the 
weapon of the oppressed.  This doctrine chiefly provides two circumstances within which Muslims are permitted to 
engage in this explicit form of Jihad: when Muslims know that injustice is being inflicted and that it is in conflict with 
Islamic Shari’a principles, and when there is a volitional intent to make a change, whether by proactively engaging in 
making (doing) change, or by verbally casting a rejection, or lastly by resisting discreetly (in their hearts).  See Ahmad 
Muath Alkhateeb Al Husseini, supra note 160. 
162  Liisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things, 24 ANN. REV. 
OF ANTHROPOLOGY 495 (1995).  
163 In an interview with Bouazizi’s mother, Mannoubia Bouazizi, she explained how they are a simple religious 
family whose devotion is expressed through prayer and praising God.  She described her son as a martyr and said that “I 
always ask mercy for his soul and the souls of all the martyrs.”  See Abouzeid, supra note 122. 
164 Susan Raine, Body, Emotion and Violence: Palestinian Suicide Bombing/Martyrdom (1993-2005), 17.2 MARBURG J. 
RELIGION  1, 1, 3 (2013). 
165 DEBORAH LUPTON, THE EMOTIONAL SELF: A SOCIOCULTURAL EXPLORATION 37 (1998). 
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society—as one body—metaphorically suffers from the pain of injustice.  This pain begins as an internal 
phenomenon that is then manifested in various ways by the oppressed populace.166 
This pain is imminent in the various trajectories of citizens’ lives, particularly in their struggle to 
enjoy fundamental social, civil, political, or economic rights. 167   Under a dictatorial regime, citizens are 
prevented from engaging in political life or from expressing their opinions freely.  Their access to 
employment, justice, health, and education is limited.  State oppression—including the curtailing of rights and 
liberties, the control of resources, censorship, corruption, and nepotism—presents additional obstacles for 
citizens living under a tyrannical government.  The lived reality of oppression, subjugation, and 
marginalization in various aspects of daily life produces a sense of profound frustration and desperation.  As 
previously mentioned, Bouazizi’s precarious existence on the margins of society without adequate legal or 
political representation, made him especially vulnerable to state interference and control.168  Yet popular 
response to his act revealed that his suffering was endemic to the lives of most Tunisians.169  
Democratic dialogue is eroded through repressive policies—the state’s “language of communication” 
with its citizens.170  Every practice that limits citizens’ liberties and freedoms can be considered an assault on 
democratic dialogue.171  The restrictive policies of repressive regimes limit communication among citizens 
and, as a result, silence dialogue between citizens and the ruling regime.172  This process of limiting channels 
of communications leaves citizens frustrated and desperate. 
As a collective body, a society under dictatorship experiences collective pain caused by governmental 
oppression.173  Communicating the experience of injustice to fellow citizens and to those entrusted to restore 
justice is often difficult under such political conditions.  Oppressive regimes operate from a site external to 
the social “body”—a site of power from which the regime dictates the rules and controls the language of civic 
communication.174  At the same time, repressive regimes construct an illusory image of an idealized, well-
functioning society. 175  In such a context, it is difficult for citizens and civil society to resist and cast out or 
challenge their experience of injustice.  
The chasm between the state’s portrayal of the government as a just and rights-respecting body and 
the violent and repressive reality of everyday life under a dictatorial regime can induce a sense of social 
dysphoria.  Accordingly, the individual citizen’s pain and the state’s awareness of inflicting injustice become 
two distinct experiences, even two separate worlds.176  The ruling elites exist in a place of control remote 
from the general population, and in that privileged space it is difficult for them to understand and relate to 
society’s pain and struggle. 
                                                
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Giorgio Agamben introduced the notion of “bare life” to refer to those who are politically damaged and 
denied both their political and legal representation.  In his reference to the stateless refugees he argues: “Insofar as its 
inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute 
biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.”  
See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 171 (1998). 
169 See POWEL & SADIKI, supra note 53. 
170 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 7 (1989). 
171 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 4 (1985). 
172  Id. 
173 Mabel Berezin, Secure States: Towards a Political Sociology of Emotion, in EMOTIONS AND SOCIOLOGY 33 (Jack 
Barbalet ed., 2002). 
174 TALAL ASAD, ON SUICIDE BOMBING 32–36 (2007). 
175 See SCARRY, supra note 171, at 72. 
176 Id. 
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Experiencing one’s own pain and understanding the pain of others are two wholly different sets of 
events.177  Bodies-in-pain—those ruled by repressive regimes—perceive the experience of pain as an absolute, 
totalizing reality.178  It is a non-negotiable, uncontested feeling of injustice “having certainty.”179  However, 
this reality remains incomprehensible to the regime that exists external to the sufferer’s body.  The ruling 
authorities understand their exercise of authoritarian powers as a manifestation of democratic legitimacy and 
are far removed from the concerns and struggles of ordinary citizens.  As such, calls for reform stemming 
from domestic civil society or from the international community are unlikely to gain traction. 
Even democratic regimes can have difficulty grasping the true sense of struggle experienced by 
certain members of society.  Regardless of the amount of effort that states invest in comprehending social 
struggles, even with “the most heroic effort [pain] can’t be grasped,”180 since the experience of hearing about 
pain amounts to an “uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized 
and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance.”181  According to Elaine 
Scarry, “hearing about pain” might constitute a model of what it is “to have doubts.”182  Even if pain is 
expressed, only a faint and blurry picture of the lived experience can actually be ascertained by the listener.  
As such, state reforms, as serious as they may be, can only address a fraction of the struggle being 
communicated. 
The Tunisian government—like other authoritarian regimes—repeatedly claimed to be mystified by 
protestors’ demands.  The regime constantly denied its human rights abuses and offered assurances that it 
was taking active steps to bring its laws into alignment with its international human rights obligations.183  On 
several occasions, the government acknowledged the international community’s criticism by introducing 
progressive-sounding legal reforms, which in theory guaranteed better domestic protections for human 
rights.184  In practice, however, these legal reforms proved to be merely another example of hollow rhetoric.185 
In a letter dated September 7, 2010, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) asked Mr. Lazhar Bououni, the 
Minister of Justice and Human Rights, and Mr. Rafik Belhaj Kacem, the Minister of Interior and Local 
Development, to explain a number of human rights violations, mainly with respect to freedom of expression 
and the right to unionize.186  HRW expressed concern about the denials of labor union activities, government 
prosecution of unionists, restrictions on the right to strike, the suppression of attempts by journalists to 
unionize, the targeting of the general union of Tunisia, and the torture by police of union members, among 
other issues.187  On October 6, 2010, the Tunisian Government replied: it emphasized the government’s 
respect of human rights and citizens’ dignity and reiterated the assurance of the Tunisians laws for the right to 
unionize.188   The government expressed its lack of comprehension of HRW queries and further denied 
allegations of possible police brutality and harassment of Tunisian students, including the case of Mohamed 




180 SCARRY, supra note 171, at 4. 
181 Id. 
182 SCARRY, supra note 171, at 13. 
183  Public Statement, AMNESTY INT’L, Tunisia: Abuses Continue Despite Official Denial (July 2, 2008), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/56000/mde300102008eng.pdf. 
184 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 112, at 3. 
185 Id. 
186 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: SILENCING LABOR AND STUDENT UNIONS IN 
TUNISIA 6 (2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/tunisia1010w.pdf. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 51–53. 
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Soudani, who was arrested on October 22, 2009.189  The government repeatedly stated that such allegations 
were “false and completely baseless.”190 
When society as a collective body endures pain, this experience is internal; the feelings are private and 
contained within the body, it is an invisible process.  While broader characteristics are collectively shared, 
individuals go through the process independently.191  Only when this experience of pain and struggle finds a 
vent for its expression does it generate a collective sense of frustration.192   However, the pain cannot be 
addressed without being repositioned from the inner sphere to the public and political domains.  This process 
of shifting pain from the private sphere to the public domain is the first stage of rendering visible the sense of 
frustration and desperation. 193   This process explains why social struggles cannot be effectively 
comprehended and “taken up” by the rational narrative provided by human rights law. 
Human rights law fails to provide a remedy for the collective pain; it becomes an ineffective tool to 
provide answers to the widespread collective feelings of frustration.  Rather, more visible, direct, and robust 
means of manifestation that can communicate the feelings of pain and suffering are required; physical 
embodiment of the metaphorical is necessary to articulate that pain—the individual body.194 
B. The Linkage Between Expressing And Diminishing Injustice 
Expressing pain can be an important prerequisite for diminishing it.195  The body that endures pain 
must find a way to express it, a cathartic medium whereby it can transfer its feelings of struggle from the 
inner, private space to the shared, external sphere.  Once pain is manifested and communicated to the public 
domain, the public can collectively work on eliminating the struggle, diminishing the pain and easing the 
suffering;196 “the act of verbally expressing pain is a necessary prelude to the collective task of diminishing 
it.”197  Under conditions of oppression and subjugation, how can individuals collectively—in other words, 
society—communicate pain? 
As previously discussed, authoritarian sovereign powers subordinate and disempower their own 
citizens. Under such conditions, tyrannical regimes control the language of civic communication—the 
democratic dialogue that occurs between citizens and their government—and exercise their power to give 
language meaning in order to marginalize and subjugate their citizens.  In a November 2011 report, HRW 
identified ten areas of repressive legal provisions that are “incompatible with a democratic and pluralistic 
society that respects its citizens’ basic human rights.” 198  The report detailed how these laws were utilized by 
Ben Ali’s regime to “stifle civil society, diminish judicial independence, limit political participation, and shield 
the president from accountability for any legal trespass, no matter how grave.”199  It emphasized how during 
                                                
189 Id. at 57. 
190 Id.  
191 SCARRY, supra note 171, at 52–53. 
192 Id. at 56. 
193 Id. 
194  Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 
THEATRE JOURNAL 519, 521 (1988). 
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197 Id. 
198 Repressive laws concerning freedom of expression, privacy and freedom of expression online, freedom of 
association, freedom to form political parties, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, the right of citizens to run 
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presidential immunity of International Crimes.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TUNISIA’S REPRESSIVE LAWS 4, 4–8 (2011). 
199 Id. 
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Ben Ali’s era legal provisions were used to punish citizens for “expressing views critical of the government 
and for addressing other subjects deemed improper for public debate.”  While using the language of freedom 
and rights, and in the name of security and restoring public order, the language of the law limited the ability 
of Tunisians to “express and access dissenting viewpoints, form independent associations or political parties, 
compete meaningfully for political office, and assemble in order to protest against the government and its 
policies.”  As a result, the government constantly targeted human rights activists, lawyers, writers, journalists, 
and political opposition members. They were harassed and imprisoned for violating these repressive laws.200 
State restriction of freedoms and civil liberties leads to a pain and frustration in the body politic.  
Some citizens are more vulnerable than others, and most submit to the ruling regime, surrendering their 
freedoms and liberties in exchange for being left alone, or at least to minimize threats of state violence.  Calls 
for reform and resistance are sublimated and displaced in the name of survival. 
While scholars such as Costas Douzinas have conceptualized human rights as arising from a universal 
recognition of one’s suffering by others, the Tunisian example shows us that this is not necessarily the case; 
state repression was well-known, and global condemnation did not translate into respect for the human rights 
of Tunisian citizens.201  In circumstances of extreme political repression, human rights are not capable of 
fulfilling this kind of recognition.202  Rather, the imaginary justice of human rights must yield to the irrational, 
the material, and the literally embodied justice of the body-in-pain.203  The Tunisian example demonstrates 
how the public manifestation of this pain may succeed in breaking collective acquiescence to tyranny when 
well-documented legal rights violations have little to no impact. 
Under the pressure of eliminating pain and suffering, there are limited ways in which sufferers—or 
those who wish to speak on their behalf, such as lawyers and human rights activists—can verbalize and 
materialize pain.  When suffering is persistent, verbal strategies are limited, inaccessible, and uncertain for 
those in the margins, such as Bouazizi.  For example, “naming and shaming” strategies204 may actually 
contribute to worsening the pain experienced by society.205  Instead of bringing the pain to light, expressing 
and articulating pain may make it increasingly invisible.206  Paradoxically, the result can be the creation of 
more restrictions on freedoms and liberties. 
In this context, bodies-in-pain can operate as a last resort means of resistance. 207   The public 
spectacle of corporeal pain can take up where language, including the language of law, fails.208   Public 
performances of bodily pain and negation, including self-immolation, can mobilize resistance to state-
imposed suffering where language and law have run out of their productive capacities.  As Warner argues, 
when “minoritized subjects had few strategies open to them,”209 the destruction of the body can become one 
of the very few available tools to gain access to the public sphere to outwardly articulate inner pain to the 
external, political sphere.  It can be the sole remaining avenue of rejecting political, social, and economic 
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suppression.210  It becomes the tool, with all its trappings of sin and haram, despite religious prohibitions 
against inflicting bodily harm, to recognize the suffering of victims of tyranny and to intervene in order to 
challenge injustice. 
C. The Linkage Between Pain And Power 
Through the politics of death, the corporeal body becomes a powerful political tool to challenge 
authoritarian sovereign powers.211  It becomes an agent that exceeds human rights–based arguments and 
radically challenges the authority of the ruling powers.  As Hardt and Negri expressed, “when life itself is 
negated in the struggle to challenge sovereignty, the power over life and death that the sovereign exercises 
becomes useless.  The absolute weapons against bodies are neutralized by the voluntary and absolute negation 
of the body.”212 
Applying this analysis to Tunisia, Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation became a vehicle for expressing 
collective pain.  He communicated his pain to other bodies that, to a certain extent, shared that pain.  By 
manifesting his pain physically, Bouazizi projected the limit of internal feelings of subjugation to the external 
sphere, thereby materializing previously inexpressible feelings in a tangible and highly visible way.  When he 
set himself on fire outside city hall, the public “took up” his act of defiance.  To borrow a notion from speech 
act theory, Bouazizi’s immolation amounted to an utterance that had a perlocutionary, or persuasive, effect on 
its audience.213  His shocking expression of pain, discontent, and powerlessness resonated with the ordinary 
Tunisian, whose own life experiences caused them to empathize with Bouazizi.  By expressing his pain 
through this external manifestation, Bouazizi transferred his inner political struggle to the outer sphere, 
becoming an agent of communication for society’s pain, thereby persuading them to act.  The Tunisian public 
empathized with his act, probably seeing a reflection of their own pain in his burning body and accordingly 
feeling a collective duty to make efforts to diminish it.214  By reaching out to the pain of others, Bouazizi’s 
extreme act forged a deep political connection that human rights law was unable to accomplish.  It challenged 
the limits of the language of human rights with its “emancipatory language.”215  It compensated for the failure 
of human rights and the moral resonance, the uplifting character and the universality that they promise but, at 
least in the case of Tunisia, did not deliver.  While the enabling conditions for human rights law to do its 
work were absent in the Tunisian context, the conventions necessary to render Bouazizi’s action as speech 
were in fact present, thus felicitously persuading the Tunisian people to rise up against the Ben Ali 
government. 
This experience is limitless; it amounts to metaphorically entering the forbidden garden, where the 
use of corporeal bodies has the power to shatter boundaries and barriers of terror, fear, dependency, poverty, 
hunger, and injustice.  When pain cannot be denied nor confined, the body, as an agent, expresses its own 
desperation and frustration, as well as that of speechless others.216  Elaine Scarry articulates this idea in The 
Body In Pain: “Though there is no ordinary language for pain, under pressure of the desire to eliminate pain, 
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an at least fragmentary means of verbalization is available both to those who are themselves in pain and to 
those who wish to speak on behalf of others.”217  
As such, the body can be perceived as an agent of change, and self-immolation as an act that rejects 
submission to an authoritarian regime.  The body becomes the narrator of the long history of injustice.218  As 
Judith Butler suggests, the body comes “in a manner of doing, dramatizing, and reproducing a historical 
situation.”219  Although generally an individual voice narrating a broad state of oppression may have little 
impact,220 when amplified and communicated, a sole voice may feed into a broader movement. 
The image of Bouazizi’s flaming body was writhing in pain, yearning for freedom, and longing to be 
understood, possessing a kind of power that the rational arguments of law could not conjure in the Tunisian 
setting.  This burning body materialized what Lacan might term Das Ding, the thing that represents or 
signifies the collectively sublimated sense of powerlessness and abjection.221  Bouazizi’s body became an icon 
for both the emptiness and pain that the regime had produced in the individual, and for resistance to that 
very state power; “[a] generic symbol of the resistance to injustice.”222  This spectacle of one body acting as an 
agent of change fueled mass mobilization set on transforming this individual act into a collective movement.  
Bouazizi’s means of expressing resistance to oppression was violent, painful, and no doubt shocking to the 
public.  It demanded a response.  Observers could not stand immobile while witnessing the excruciating 
destruction of the spiritually and culturally sacred body.  Bouazizi’s action enabled a kind of collective 
catharsis.  The struggle of the burning body, its manifestation of physical pain, and the shared sense of 
frustration all fueled the sense of solidarity and collective struggle; this enabled Bouazizi’s body to have 
political ramifications in the wider social sphere.223 
It can be argued that Bouazizi’s act was a form of political protest in that its genesis and implications 
went beyond the individual act of suicide.  His frustration was an individual case among millions of others; as 
such, a broader sense of frustration and desperation was projected onto, and out from, his actions.  After 
Bouazizi’s pained, oppressed body cried out the story of pain and struggle, millions of other unheard, 
frustrated bodies merged with his.  Through his unprecedented action in the Arab World, others acquired the 
impetus to relinquish their fear and to articulate their shared desperation.  By using his corporeal body, 
Bouazizi succeeded in rendering injustice visible.  He managed to give a clear, loud voice to the unheard, if 
only for a brief, yet staggering moment.  At the moment the body is destroyed, it becomes the center of 
attention.  Feeding into the frustration of unspoken voices, it transforms one individual’s act into a 
provocative phenomenon, spurring broader social movements for change.224 
His wounds communicated collective injury.  As a result of the failed communication of the rational 
argument, which was systemically discredited by the ruling regime, Bouazizi’s self-destruction was an act of 
last resort.  When rational arguments exhaust their limits, wounds become “accepted as objective evidence, as 
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more reliable sources of knowledge than the words of the people on whose bodies those wounds are 
found.”225 
V. THE RETURN TO THE LAW 
When repressive regimes deny and eliminate the emancipatory potential of legal claims and rights 
arguments, citizens may turn to alternative modes of resistance including using the body as catalysts for 
change.226  In this regard, we can see how under conditions of repression and injustice, the human body is 
transformed into an irrefutable argument for change when other avenues of legal argument have run out.  
This final section examines how corporeal acts of resistance can spur collective actions that disrupt existing 
legal regimes and yield legal change and transformation.  That is, acts of bodily resistance emanating from 
outside the formal domains of law and legal argument can catalyze social movements key to achieving 
political and legal reform in repressive contexts.  The individual body can work to reclaim law for the social 
body. 
A. The Dialectic Of The Body-In-Pain  
In the case of revolutionary Tunisia, the individual body-in-pain reached out to vast, throbbing, and 
frantic waves of muffled and pulverized bodies.227   It mobilized a massive wave of anonymous bodies—
“anonymous corporeality”228—to march the streets of Tunisia.  In an unprecedented theatrical scene, all the 
bodies-in-pain merged and became one anonymous body speaking for the collective.229  They chanted the 
mantra of the Jasmine Revolution, Ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām, 230  expressing their repudiation of the 
authoritarian Ben Ali regime and their collective will to bring it down. 
The Jasmine Revolution’s collective action mobilized a new kind of politics, one that circumvented 
the failure of law’s rationality and its empty promise of safeguarding citizens’ rights.  As such, the body-in-
pain (the means that brought the collective together) was repositioned from a helpless disenfranchised body 
to a proxy of change.  Remarkably, as an empowered body, it negotiated a new social contract and laid the 
basis for a new body of the law. 
The act of self-destruction becomes a voice that demands justice.  It communicates, not only an 
individual pain, but also a collective injury, a collective state of frustration.  Through the ultimate mode of 
protest, the body-in-pain creates a moment of emancipation and opens a space for new possibilities.  How 
should we understand the emancipatory and productive power of this extraordinary act of bodily destruction?  
How does the negation of oneself become a validation of the existence of the whole? 
The Tunisian Revolution and reform process provides an example of how solitary acts of bodily 
resistance can fuel the social mobilization needed to achieve regime change, constitutional reform, and legal 
transformation. 231   The emergence of this synthesis suggests a dialectical relationship between rational 
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arguments of law and the irrational spectacle of the body-in-pain.  The new Tunisian Constitution honors the 
body-in-pain as a witness,232 and also serves as a reminder of the limits of law in dealing with certain forms of 
injustice.  Accordingly, it is important to understand how the body-in-pain was reconfigured in the body of 
post-revolutionary law and was translated from the language of disenfranchisement and suffering back into a 
language of effective rights. 
B. The Dialectic Of The Body-In-Pain And A Virtuous Body In Law  
In October 2011, following months of protest and the overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime, the elected 
National Constituent Assembly (“NCA”) was commissioned to draft a new constitution for post-
revolutionary Tunisia. 233    Several blueprints were advanced 234  and drafts were prepared; the text was 
vigorously debated.235   On January 26, 2014, a new constitution236 was ratified to reflect and confirm the 
“victory over dictatorship.”237  
The post-revolution Constitution—in its opening lines—states that the people of Tunisia will rule 
their country and utilize the law to speak on their behalf.  
We, the representatives of the Tunisian people, members of the National 
Constituent Assembly, Taking pride in the struggle of our people to gain 
independence and to build the State, to eliminate autocracy and achieve its 
free will, as a realization of the objectives of the revolution of freedom and 
dignity, the revolution of 17 December 2010–14 January 2011, out of 
loyalty to the blood of our virtuous martyrs and the sacrifices of Tunisian 
men and women over the course of generations, and to break with injustice, 
inequity and corruption.238  
The Preamble anchors the Constitution in the country’s history.  It looks backward to narrate the past and 
the struggle of the nation during the prior regime.  It gives significance to the struggle and sacrifices of the 
Tunisians to liberate themselves from tyranny and inequality. 
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The Preamble explicitly emphasizes the role of the people in achieving change.  Accordingly, it 
acknowledges the successful mobilization of the revolution, which the Tunisians launched in order “to 
achieve the objectives of the revolution for freedom and dignity, the revolution of December 17, 2010 
through January 14, 2011.”239  It reaffirms the nation’s commitment to the teachings of Islam even as it 
emphasizes the role of the people by enshrining the sacrifices made by the “virtuous martyrs” and 
constitutionalizes the tale of collective injury and corporeal suffering as the predicate for emancipation.  It is a 
reminder of the power of the body when it performs pain to catalyze socio-political change.  It offers a 
timeless commemoration of all pained bodies and privileges their sacrifice and their drive to free themselves 
from tyranny regardless of their gender, age, background, or personal conditions.  The Preamble invokes the 
specter of a body-in-pain and grants it a divine significance; it references “virtuous martyrs” who sacrificed 
their lives and resorted to radical strategies to break “with injustice, inequity, and corruption.”240  
Similar to the Constitution of 1959, the country’s first since it gained independence from France in 
1956, the new constitution announces the beginning of a new era where the free will of the people is the main 
guiding principle of the state (“bequeathing a secure life to future generations, realizing the will of the people 
to be the makers of their own history”), implying that Tunisia was never independent and the tyrant Ben Ali’s 
regime was a continuity of the past “foreign domination.”241  Remarkably, both the 1959 and the 2014 
constitutions used the same language to describe colonial domination; both referred to the past regimes as 
tyrannical.242  The Constitution of 1959 defined Tunisia as a democracy founded on the sovereignty of the 
people and repeatedly invoked the importance of remaining faithful to universal human values—human 
dignity, justice, and liberty.  It paid tribute to the will of the Tunisian people, who freed themselves from 
exploitation, regression and foreign domination thanks to their strong cohesion and their fight against 
tyranny.243  
The 2014 Preamble also casts the radical acts of self-destruction as acts of martyrdom, despite the 
religious and cultural consequences of bodily desecration.  The Constitution portrays the individual body-in-
pain as pure, honorable, and immaculate, sacrificed to denounce injustice, in search of independence, 
freedom, and dignity.244  This recognition is reflective of the great impact of the body-in-pain in its positive, 
emancipatory connotation to the post-revolutionary system.  By evoking the communality and speaking in the 
name of the martyrs, the constitutional drafters aimed to legitimize both the new Constitution and those who 
sacrificed their lives to make it possible.  The Preamble not only anchors the legitimacy of the new 
Constitution in a repudiated past littered with bodies in pain, but also articulates a moral obligation for the 
people of Tunisia to liberate others who are suffering from oppression. 245   The first paragraph of the 
                                                
239 Id.  
240 Id. 
241 See 1959 Tunisia Const. pmbl. (“We, the representatives of the Tunisian people, meeting as members of the 
Constituent National Assembly, proclaim the will of this people, who freed themselves from foreign domination thanks 
to their strong cohesion and their fight against tyranny, exploitation and regression”) translated in 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf. ) 
242  سنوت روتسد [CONSTITUTION] of 2014 (Tunis.), translated in 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf; روتسد سنوت  [CONSTITUTION] of 1959 (Tunis.), 
translated in http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf. 
243 Id. 
244 See 1959 Tunisia Const. art. IV. (establishing the motto of the Tunisian Republic as “freedom, order and 
justice.”).  See also 2014 Tunisia Const. art. IV (modifying the phrase to “freedom, dignity justice, order.”). 
245 See 2014 Tunisia Const. pmbl. (“[I]n cooperation with the peoples of the world; supporting the oppressed 
everywhere and the people’s right to self-determination, and just liberation movements at the forefront of which is the 
Palestinian liberation movement; and standing against all forms of occupation and racism”). 
2016 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW                                                          167 
 
Constitution gives agency to the anonymous corporality, all those who advanced their most precious 
possession, their lives, “over the course of generations” to achieve change and succeed in breaking with the past.246 
The Constitution establishes a new relationship between the state and the people.  It declares the 
“independence” of the state where the people of Tunisia draw their own roadmap for their country.  
The Preamble articulates the aspirations of the Tunisians to have “a participatory, democratic, 
republican system, in the framework of a civil state founded on the law and on the sovereignty of the people, 
exercised through the peaceful alternation of power through free elections.”247  It outlines the main features 
of the post-revolutionary political system, which is “founded on the principle of the separation and balance of powers, 
which guarantees the freedom of association in conformity with the principles of pluralism,” as well as an administrative 
system that is based on notions of impartiality, good governance, and a judicial system “that guarantees 
respect for human rights and freedoms, independence of the judiciary, equality of rights and duties between 
all citizens, male and female, and equality between all regions.” 
The new Constitution weaves the legacy of the body-in-pain into the body of law.  To be sure, the 
promises of the new Constitution remain to be realized.  Yet what took place in Tunisia before, during, and 
after the revolution was a truly remarkable form of a change that was dialectic in nature.  The failures of law 
under the Ben Ali regime gave way to a revolutionary burning body that mobilized collective resistance to the 
state’s tyranny in ways that supplanted the failures of law.  
In synthetic fashion, the corporeal political body finally resolved itself in a constitution that 
reinstalled law as the primary vehicle through which politics would be channeled and articulated.  Thus we 
witness a dialectic: from law’s failure emerged its opposite, a corporal form of political action, which in turn 
resolved synthetically into the rebirth of law.248 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under certain conditions of state injustice, authoritarian powers become impervious to legal critiques 
of their abuse of power.  When governments are unresponsive to calls for change and when citizens’ rights 
and demands are persistently neglected or ignored altogether, the potential of human rights based legal norms 
to challenge governmental power is limited.  Domestic, national, and international legal claims are rendered 
ineffective tools for reform, and an overall state of stasis, collective frustration and desperation prevails. 
The failure of human rights based arguments creates an opportunity for “political” action by 
unrecognized “bodies-in-pain.”  In such a context, extralegal acts prove more powerful than law in effecting 
change.  The destruction of the body as a political act is one example of a radical, violent method of 
expressing oppression and struggle.  The phenomenon of individual self-destruction narrates the story of 
thousands of pained bodies.  It offers a platform for bodies-in-pain to communicate their struggle; it is a 
method by which they can transfer collective pain from internal, sublimated spaces to the public sphere and 
through which they shatter boundaries and reconstruct their worlds. 
Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation was unprecedented in the Arab world, and it was a shocking act of 
political resistance.  Although the dramatic act of self-destruction was in theory both religiously and culturally 
unacceptable, it resonated with the experience of others and their yearning to express themselves, thereby 
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stimulating thousands of other bodies to act as catalysts for change.  Bouazizi’s act was able to spur others to 
demand political change where other movements had been unable to do so for generations.  Such corporeal 
actions can be characterized as individual acts of defiance that may not necessarily intend to spark social 
change, but may do so if they feed into, or manifest, an existing dynamic of widespread social frustration. 
In the particular case of Tunisia, the corporeal logic of the body-in-pain manifested the limits of the 
normative human rights discourse—rooted in the language of human rights.  By stepping outside the body of 
the law, the human body succeeded in challenging state power, created a momentum of emancipation, 
renegotiated its social contract, and engaged in the making of law.  By returning to the language of the law, 
the body-in-pain was repositioned as an empowered body, which spoke the language of change on behalf of 
the collective.  Through a dialectic process the body evolved from the geography of pain to the geography of 
law, through which the body of the law embodied the body-in-pain as a means to eliminate human suffering 
and fulfill the collective’s aspirations. 
